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Abstract
This article looks into the nature and dynamics of Soviet assistance to the Governorate 
of Sheng Shicai, a military de facto state that existed in Xinjiang between 1933 and 1944. 
Besides discussing how the various forms of Soviet aid shaped the policies of the 
Governorate, it also examines how Sheng Shicai used the aid to pursue his desire for 
inclusive patriotism and social modernization into practice. The article further shows 
how the ussr actively supported Sheng Shicai’s development policies in an urge to 
securitize its borderlands by abetting ideologically aligned state-building and social 
transformation there. Although it was done with entirely different actors, methods, 
and within very different political frameworks, the aid securitization and borderland 
control logic makes this episode a historical forerunner of the state-building and social 
development aid in international neo-protectorates today.
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“Sag mir, wer dein Feind ist, und ich sage dir, wer du bist.”
[Tell me who your enemy is, and I will tell you who you are.]
Carl Schmitt (1888–1985)
∵
This article examines the wide-ranging assistance that Moscow provided to 
Sheng Shicai’s governorate, a military de facto state that existed in Xinjiang 
province between 1933 and 1944. It draws on an excellent book by Emma 
Mawdsley on the so-called emerging donors of international aid.1 When read-
ing the section on Soviet aid policies in the chapter on histories and lineages of 
non-oecd aid, we felt that the ussr’s aid policies during the Stalinist era 
(1922–1953) were treated too briefly.2 Contrary to what is explicitly claimed in 
the book, the ussr under Stalin did engage in a variation of multisector  foreign 
aid, despite its clear drive for rapid internal development and self- sufficiency. 
At that time, the “Third World” did not exist; indeed, the concept did not 
appear until 1952.3 Most countries and societies in Africa, India, and the Arab 
and Indonesian spheres were either colonies, protectorates, or mandate terri-
tories of one of the major Western European powers (or of Japan, in the case of 
Korea and northeastern China), or mandate territories of the League of 
Nations, which were de facto administered by one of these powers.
 State Failures and Great Spaces
Nor did the Moscow leadership perceive these areas and societies as merely a 
passive extension of the capitalist and imperialist sphere. Although its leaders 
had largely given up on worldwide revolution export by 1924 in favor of Stalin’s 
“Socialism in One Country” doctrine and no longer explicitly called for all-out 
1 Emma Mawdsley, From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development 
Landscape (London: Zed Books, 2012).
2 Ibid., 49.
3 For an overview and discussion of the evolution of the aid economy, its doctrines and its 
approaches, see Erik Thorbecke, “The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role 
of Foreign Aid, 1950–2000,” in Finn Tarp and Peter Hjertholm (eds), Foreign Aid and 
Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future (London: Routledge, 2000), 17–47.
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decolonization, the ussr, especially during the latter Stalinist years, did have 
contacts and did offer various forms of support to national movements and 
native power elites in these areas, including those not of communist or social-
ist orientation.4 Development either cooperation, in its current meaning and 
practices, did not exist at that time. However, the ussr, besides giving military 
aid and concluding preferential trade agreements with lower-income coun-
tries, did organize civilian aid activities that, in modern development jargon, 
could be categorized as technical assistance, social development, debt relief, 
capacity building, and governance reform. While it was not called “develop-
ment cooperation,” the ussr delivered sizeable amounts of aid of this kind to 
Mongolia from 1929–1936 onward, as well as to communist China after 
1949–1952.
It is not well known that the ussr gave aid to unrecognized states in central 
Eurasia bordering the ussr, like the Governorate of Sheng Shicai (1933–1944) 
and the East Turkestan Republic of Kulja (1944–1949), which both emerged in 
Xinjiang. This aid was clearly embedded in a frontier securitization approach 
that was not only limited to various forms of military presence, but also encom-
passed active support to state-building and social transformation projects per-
ceived to be ideologically affiliated. Yet what, exactly, was this state-like 
“Governorate of Sheng Shicai”? Its formation has to be situated against the 
background of the political fragmentation of the Chinese great space that 
characterized a large portion of the period between the demise of the Chinese 
empire in 1911 and the communist takeover in 1949.5
With parts of China under control of the communist guerrillas, de facto 
independent fiefdoms or Japanese occupation, the republican Guomindang-
led government in Nanjing could often only exert varying degrees of influence 
through power-sharing agreements with its governors and military command-
ers, local warlords, native elders, and ethnic minority movements. Today, this 
situation would be called state failure.
4 For a more in-depth examination, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World 
Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
53–66. China, or rather, the Chinese great space (which was politically heavily fractured and 
partly occupied by Japan after 1931–1932), Korea (still a Japanese colony), Iran, and Abyssinia 
(Ethiopia), both of which were not European colonies despite temporary occupations, 
played a central role in Moscow’s “Third World” strategy back then.
5 We use the term “great space” in the sense of Carl Schmitt’s concept of “Großraum” is his 
book Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte, 
which is a geographical area dominated by a power representing a distinct political idea.
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There were several population groups who were instrumental in the spread 
of Soviet influence in Xinjiang. None of them resembled a proletariat that could 
be a presumed vector of socialism. The first, paradoxically, consisted of people 
who had fled the Soviet realm between 1919 and 1931. These included the 13,000 
to 18,000 White and émigré Russians who had settled in and around Kulja 
(Yining) and Ürümçi, the estimated 190,000 ethnic Kazakhs who had fled the 
ussr for Xinjiang after then start of the Stalinist collectivization campaigns and 
the subsequent famine. Although in principle, all of these should have been 
regarded as breeding grounds for anti-Soviet activities in the region, the Soviet 
consulate-general in Ürümçi and the consulate in Kulja, made overtures to these 
groups in order to create a base in the province.
Second, certain Uyghur elite factions – including Khoja notables, members 
of Xinjiang’s religious and tribal aristocracies – as well as Islamic reformers, 
especially in the Kulja region and in northern Xinjiang, had put their hopes in 
the ussr to counterweight the dominance of China and to support their aspi-
rations for autonomy or independence. With Xinjiang in a state of anarchy and 
fragmentation, the pacification and perceived economic and social progress in 
the ussr also made it an attractive – if idealized – model for some.
Third, and most important, there were Chinese civil servants and military 
commanders in Xinjiang who were formally subordinated to the republican 
government in Nanjing, but were in practice largely disconnected from it and 
looking elsewhere for assistance to consolidate their position and interests.6
 The Functionality of “Cockpit States”
The Governorate of Sheng Shicai began in spring 1933 and lasted until his 
departure in summer 1944. Although Sheng Shicai, who held the military rank 
of general, was officially governor of Xinjiang province within its official 
boundaries, the area under his actual control was initially limited to an arc 
stretching from the Ili Valley to the Ürümçi area and parts of the Jungar plateau 
in the north of the province, somewhat parallel to the border with the ussr. In 
6 Marie-Claire Bergère, “L’influence du modèle soviétique sur la politique des minorités natio-
nales en Chine. La cas du Sinkiang (1949–1962),” Revue française de Science politique, 29, no. 3 
(1979): 408; David Wang, “Soviet Citizenship in Xinjiang,” Asian Studies Review, 19, no. 3 (1996): 
88. See also Raïsa Mirovitskaya, “Kitaiskaya provintsiya Sin'tszyan v Sovetsko-Kitaiskikh 
otnosheniyakh (1930–1940),” Kitai v mirovoi i regional'noi politike – i sovremennost', 15, no. 15 
(2010): 237–247.
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1937, with Soviet backing, his army managed to recapture Kashgar from the 
36th Division of Hui commander Ma Zhongying.
They had societies in Sheng Shicai’s jurisdiction was overwhelmingly rural 
and agricultural and had societies dominated by local and micro-regional social 
identities and regulated by customary law, genealogically defined solidarity 
groups, and confessional systems, primarily Sunni Islam and micro-regional folk 
practices.7
Due to political instability and the fact that the first modern-method census 
in Xinjiang was only organized in 1953, there is only a patchy picture of Xinjiang’s 
demography at this time. Yet, a police survey of 1940–1941 put the population of 
Xinjiang at some 3.73 million of which roughly three-quarters lived in the south 
and 3.43 million (92.5%) were Muslim by confession. Ethnically, about 80% of 
Xinjiang’s population then consisted of Uyghurs or sedentary Turkic micro-
regional groups officially named that way after 1935; 8.7% were Kazakhs living in 
the Ili Valley and the piedmont of the Altai range, and 1.7% were Kyrgyz who 
primarily lived in Ulugqat prefecture and other regions around Kashgar. The Hui 
(a Sino-Muslim population group), who lived in northern Xinjiang, the Ili Valley 
and in the cities of the south, reportedly numbered 92,000 or 2.5% at that time. 
Finally, the number of Han was estimated at some 187,000 or 5%, with specific 
concentrations in and around Ürümçi (then also called Dihua in Chinese), 
Kumul (Hami), and northern Xinjiang in general, hence a member of and, to 
a  lesser extent, in settlements and garrison quarters (hence a member of the 
 so-called Twin Cities) near the major centers in the south.8
Ethnically Han, China’s dominant majority culture, Sheng Shicai originated 
from the northeastern Liaoning province, in a part of the country that had long 
been under active Japanese and Russian influence before it became a semi-
colony of Japan in 1931. He was thus not a native of Xinjiang nor did he grow up 
there as a member of the long-established Han minority in the province. 
Instead, he was initially assigned to the area by the Nanjing government in 1930 
as the chief military instructor of Governor Jin Shuren, who already main-
tained close, if much more pragmatic, ties with the ussr. In that capacity, 
Sheng Shicai quelled the initially successful Uyghur rebellion in Kumul with 
7 For a detailed examination of the social organization of the Uyghur or different Uyghur 
groups, see Ildikó Bellér-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang – Toward a Historical 
Anthropology of the Uyghur, 1880–1949 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), and, for the Kazakhs, Ian 
Morrison, “Some Notes on the Kazakhs of Sinkiang,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society, 36 (1948–49): 67–71.
8 Chang Chih-Yi, “Land Utilization and Settlement Possibilities in Sinkiang,” Geographical 
Review, 39, no. 1 (1949: 62).
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the help of a White émigré Russian unit and some Soviet aircraft, and he was 
subsequently promoted chief military commander of Xinjiang. Having no 
broad ethnic or social base in the province, once he became governor through 
a coup d’état himself, he had to create one through interpersonal networks, 
mobilizing support among the native population, and an externally backed 
ideological project.
Although at a certain moment, it had the character of a proper state, Sheng 
Shicai’s governorate was not recognized by other countries – not even the 
ussr – or by supranational organs like the League of Nations. In that respect, 
it had many characteristics of so-called quasi states. Also named “de facto 
states,” these are political entities that do have the four basic characteristics 
and attributes of a state – a territory with formal borders, a permanent popula-
tion, governance structures, and state symbols – but which are not recognized 
as independent states by other countries and by supranational institutions. So, 
while they exist in practice, under international law they do not.
According to Michael Rywkin, quasi states, which have existed throughout 
modern history, share four characteristics. First, they came into being through 
secession from a state during a violent ethnic or social conflict or because of the 
disintegration of a parent state. Second, they have an external patron state that is 
either taking advantage of their secession or that provides sizeable amounts of 
assistance to the secessionist entity. Third, quasi states are not recognized by 
authoritative supranational organs or by any other state, except perhaps the 
patron state. And fourth, despite the vital need for external support and inputs 
and the lack of recognition, many quasi sates are able to function as mini-states. 
Their economy and financial system are usually closely intertwined with those of 
the patron state, they manage to maintain armed forces and a defense system, and 
conduct international relations, albeit through officious and informal channels.9
In practice, since they are the product of conflict, the contours of a quasi 
state’s actual territory are also in a flux; their officially declared borders often 
reflect an aspired rather than an actually controlled territory. Also, the purpose 
of quasi states is not necessarily to achieve internationally recognized inde-
pendence.10 Rather, their purpose and function can also be as a temporary safe 
haven for a sociocultural community perceived to be under threat, a power 
9 Michael Rywkin, “Le phénomène des ‘quasi états’,” Diogène – Revue internationale des sci-
ences humaines, 2 no. 10 (2005): 32–33. Examples of quasi states in the realm of the old 
ussr are Transnistria, South Ossetia, and, though much more in a flux at the time of writ-
ing, Donbass in southeastern Ukraine.
10 See also Marcin Kosienkowski, “Is Internationally Recognized Independence the Goal of 
Quasi states? The Case of Transnistria,” in Natalia Cwicinskaja and Piotr Oleksy (eds), 
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base and political lever for counter-elites or renegade segments of elites 
within a state or great space, or a temporary entity that has to facilitate the 
(re-)integration in another state or great space. Finally, quasi states can act as 
a social laboratory, where a societal and ideological model is tested in anticipa-
tion of its planned or hoped-for generalization in a larger area that is still to be 
acquired or reconquered. The latter is of particular relevance for this case 
study, since de facto states, because they are often still “under construction,” 
often form a framework for the implementation of extraneously championed 
forms of governance and societal organization that are to anchor influence 
and secure the borderlands of powers in a given social-geographic area. As such, 
they function as a ‘cockpit’ for a political-ideological project.
 Externalities As Aid Catalysts
In this respect, James Fearon and David Laitin, when examining what they call 
“neo-trusteeship,” bring in a number of relevant elements and notions.11 Of course, 
they based themselves on cases and situations that came into being six to seven 
decades later, after the demise of the ussr itself. Nonetheless, elements charac-
terizing present-day international interventionism in contexts as varied as Bosnia, 
Kosovo, East Timor, and “rump Somalia” were already present in the cases exam-
ined here. Essentially, neo-trusteeship is how to exercise multispectrum control 
on a given area. “Similar to classical imperialism,” Fearon and Laitin elaborate,
these efforts involve a remarkable degree of control over domestic political 
authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries. In contrast to 
classical imperialism, in these new forms of rule, subjects are governed by 
a complex hodgepodge of foreign powers, international and nongovern-
mental organizations, and domestic institutions rather than by a single 
imperial trust power asserting monopoly rights within its domain.12
[…]
In contrast to classical imperialism but in line with the concept of trust-
eeship, the parties to these complex interventions typically seek an inter-
national mandate for their rule. Finally, whereas classical imperialists 
Moldova: In Search of Its Own Place in Europe (Bydgoszcz : Oficyna Wydawnicza Epigram, 
2013), 55–65.
11 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Neo-Trusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” 
International Security, 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43.
12 Ibid.: 7.
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conceived of their empires as indefinite in time, the agents of neo- 
trusteeship want to exit as quickly as possible, after intervening to recon-
struct or reconfigure states so as to reduce threats arising from either 
state collapse or rogue regimes threats which are called “bad externali-
ties” that result from the combination of the scientific revolution and 
political disorder, economic collapse and anger in peripheral societies.13
Moscow faced several “bad externalities” in Xinjiang. First, the disintegration 
of the Chinese great space despite the nominal presence of a central govern-
ment fed genuine concerns that semi-anarchy could spill over into the south-
ern ussr’s border regions. Second, there were economic and geographic 
concerns, given how close the ussr-Xinjiang border was to the Turksib Railway, 
the Karaganda mining basin, and the fledgling industrial centers of northern 
Kazakhstan.14
Third, there were concerns that imperial Japan, after it set up a first protec-
torate in China’s northeast in 1931–1932 and further invaded the country in 
1937, would capitalize on both the power vacuum and ethno-nationalist aspi-
rations among the native Turkic population of Xinjiang.15 Fourth, following the 
experience with the short-lived first East Turkestan republic (late 1933-spring 
1934) in southern Xinjiang,16 there was the concern that the establishment of 
successful political experiments, particularly of an Islamic or Pan-Turkic 
13 Ibid., 13.
14 For an in-depth examination of Stalinist-Soviet interventionism in Xinjiang and the secu-
rity considerations that drove them, see Vyacheslav Shitko, “Voiska ogpu-nkvd v 
lokal’nykh voinakh i konfliktakh: 1922–Iyun’ 1944 gg,” unpublished dissertation no. 61–07–
7/962, Moscow, Defense University, 2007.
15 For a more in-depth examination, see Patrick von zur Mühlen, “Japan und die sowjetische 
Nationalitätenfrage am Vorabend und während des Zweiten Weltkrieges,” Vierteljahreshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1973): 325–333; H. von Waldheim, “Les puissances et la politique 
turco-tatare,” Politique étrangère, 3, no. 3 (1938): 236–249. Japan had two protectorates in 
northeastern China: the State of Manchuria (1932–August 1945) and, in an attempt to co-
opt Pan-Mongolism, the Mengjiang United Autonomous Government (1939–August 
1945).
16 The first, unrecognized, Republic of East Turkestan existed from late 1933 to spring 1934 in 
southern Xinjiang, more specifically the districts of Kashgar (where its capital was) and 
Yarkand. Proclaimed and led by Sabit Damullah, it had a more explicitly Pan-Turkic, 
Sunni Islamic, Jadidist, and anti-Soviet ideological framework. After some five months of 
shaky existence, it was deposed by the 36th Division of the equally Muslim but ethnically 
Hui warlord and Guomindang ally Ma Zhongying. For details, see Andrew D.W. Forbes, 
Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 
1911–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 112–116.
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nature, could somehow inspire and encourage opinion leaders, underground 
opposition, and population segments among the ussr’s Turkic and Tajik pop-
ulation.17 And fifth, there was the urge to recover and secure the market for 
Soviet consumer goods and equipment from the Anglo-American and German 
firms that had moved into Xinjiang during the Russian Civil War.18
Mark Duffield stresses the important role and power of development assis-
tance in securing borderlands and tackling bad externalities. In his opinion, 
strategic alliances between metropolitan and peripheral states, an important 
aspect of the former balance of power, lost their geopolitical rationale in the 
post-Cold War world, and led to a cirsis of state-based security. Rather than 
enfeeblement and paralysis, however, the crisis of state-based security pro-
duced a new security framework based not on the accumulation of arms and 
external political alliances between states, but on changing the conduct of 
populations inside them. “Within this new public-private security framework,” 
Duffield says, “stability is achieved by activities designed to reduce poverty, sat-
isfy basic needs, strengthen economic sustainability, create representative civil 
institutions, protect the vulnerable and promote human rights: the name if 
this largely privatized form of security is ‘development’.”19
In Duffield’s conceptualization, aid is essentially aimed at changing the con-
duct of populations in a given area, which also implies promoting preferred 
models of societal organization and value and norms systems, as well as pro-
viding support to local actors who advocate them, whether due to a visionary 
project, opportunism, or a combination of both. Of course, today’s interven-
tionism in that respect is to a large extent multilateral and subcontracted to 
private or semi-private actors. For its part, Soviet aid to Xinjiang – a three-
pronged approach consisting of direct and indirect military intervention (offi-
cially called “Peace Preservation”), aid aimed at economic rehabilitation and 
social development, and state-building – was largely bilateral and exclusively 
involved the state, state-embedded patronage networks, and state-controlled 
associations or corporations. Multilateral bodies like the League of Nations 
17 Shitko, “Voiska ogpu-nkvd v lokal’nykh voinakh i konfliktakh.”
18 A more detailed case-based account can be found in Tamara Shemetova, “Iz istorii bor’by 
Sovetskikh torgovykh organizatsii s inostrannymi firmami za Sin’tsyanskii rynok v sered-
ine 20-kh gg. xx veka (na primere vaimootnoshenii s Germanskoi firmoi ‘Faist i ke.’),” Mir, 
nauki, kul’tury, obrazovaniya, 33, no. 2 (2012).
19 Mark Duffield, “Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid,” Disasters, 25, no. 
4 (2001): 310. See also, by the same author, “Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization 
of Development: Aid as a Relation of a Global Liberal Governance,” Development and 
Change, 33, no. 5 (2002): 1049–1071.
De Cordier
central asian affairs 3 (2016) 49-76
<UN>
58
and the United Nations played no role in the process, and nongovernmental 
organizations, today a major sub-contractor of aid, hardly existed.
In terms of ideological frameworks and activity sectors, Soviet aid and the 
actors and institutions through which it was locally channeled, did not put 
similar emphasis on the human rights ideology nor on artificial civil society, 
but on the reduction of poverty, the social uplifting of the native masses, the 
development of tangible social and economic infrastructure, and on social-
ism and patriotism. The overall situation in Xinjiang was perceived to offer 
both the momentum and opportunity to implant a friendly alternative 
through the duplication of (parts of) Moscow’s social development, nation-
building, and Sovietization policies that had just been applied in the Caspian-
Central Asian region and in Mongolia.20 It was a two-way process, though, in 
the sense that this could not be done without the co-optation and the active, 
interested input of local actors and interest groups, especially in areas out-
side the ussr.
 “Frontier Socialism” or Hybrid Governance?
Local actors and interest groups who become clients are much more than 
mere sub-contractors or docile administrators. They are most often conscious 
individuals, networks, and political groups with their own agendas, aspira-
tions, and survival instincts. To realize their diverse aims, they look for exter-
nal support and often manage to steer the latter to their own advantage or that 
of their support base.21 It is tempting to dismiss Sheng Shicai as yet another 
sadistic warlord who tyrannized and looted a private fiefdom and its popula-
tion. While his rule indeed was authoritarian and brutal – traits necessary to 
survive in Xinjiang back then – and based on personal patronage networks, it 
went well beyond mere exploitation or greed. In that respect, he reportedly 
differed from his immediate predecessor. In his detailed political portrait of 
the man, Fook-Lam Chan describes Sheng Shicai as a convinced Chinese 
20 For a detailed account of the nationalities and social transformation policies in the 
Caspian-Central Asian region of the ussr, see Olivier Roy, La nouvelle Asie centrale, ou la 
fabrication des nations (Paris: Seuil, 1997): 93–136.
21 In the case of Sheng Shicai, Stalin and his delegates in Moscow were well aware of 
this, as is reflected in Stalin’s castigating 1934 note to his consul-general in Ürümçi men-
tioning Sheng Shicai’s “desperate Leftism.” rgaspi, letter of July 27, 1934, from Stalin to 
Garegin Apresov, consul-general in Ürümçi, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/121898.
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nationalist who considered Xinjiang province to be a permanent part of the 
motherland.22
Besides nationalism and patriotism, his ideological framework consisted of 
leftist-socialist ideas and a strong anti-Japanese stance, both of which were 
rooted in the conviction that China’s social and economic stagnation were due 
to imperialist exploitation and the domestic forces that helped to sustain it.23 
Much of this is believed to have been shaped by personal experiences in his 
native Liaoning province, during his stay at the Imperial War College in Japan 
in 1925, and while he served, in the 1927–1929 period, in Feng Yuxiang’s Soviet-
backed Guominjun (Nationalist Army), a leftist-nationalist faction that was 
active in Liaoning during the warlord era and that supported the Guomindang 
government.24 Also, at the time, Stalin’s ussr and its development approaches 
were not yet associated with the horrors of the labor camps and the collectiv-
ization disaster, as they commonly are today.
Instead, the Soviet Union’s perceived economic and social achievements, 
viewed alongside the Great Depression, raised not a few hopes and expecta-
tions for a more just order of things among leftists (not only Soviet-aligned com-
munists) worldwide, not only in China but also in India, Iran, Western Europe, 
and the Americas. During the period under examination, the Communist Party 
of China was just beginning to gain some foothold in Xinjiang. A “Stalinist-
Soviet Xinjiang” accompanied by the creation of modern nationalities and 
social transformation similar to that which had occurred in the Caspian-Central 
Asian and Caucasian parts of the ussr could thus be a social laboratory for the 
societal model its champions hoped to expand to other parts of China, once the 
country stabilized and became functional again.
22 Fook-Lam Gilbert Chan, “Shen Shih-Ts’ai’s Reform Programs in Sinkiang: Idealism or 
Opportunism?” Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History – Academia Sinica, no. 12 (1983): 
365–384.
23 Ibid.
24 Called Fengtian between 1907 and 1929, what is now Liaoning province was part of an 
area under informal and alternating Russian and Japanese influence since about 1875. 
After having defeated China in the 1894–1895 war, Japan claimed the Liaodong peninsula. 
Yet, in 1898, Russia was granted a concession over it. With Russian and Japanese assis-
tance and capital, parts of the province were industrialized and thus confronted with 
corresponding sociological changes. In 1896–1903, it was connected to the Russian rail-
road system with the construction of the Eastern Railway between Port Arthur and 
Harbin. Many major battles in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, including these of Port 
Arthur and Mukden, took place in the area. Eventually, Liaoning was invaded by Japan in 
1931 and incorporated the following year into the State of Manchuria, of which it remained 
part until 1945.
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Since the number of fellow Han and Hui was relatively limited in Xinjiang 
and even fewer would be considered reliable or loyal to him, Sheng Shicai 
wanted to build a support base among the native Turkic majority. It was not all 
about political calculations, however. As a visionary outsider, Sheng Shicai 
reportedly also had a sincere fascination for his jurisdiction’s beautiful land-
scapes and native population and was thus also driven by an idealistic urge to 
uplift the latter though a project of “Inclusive Patriotism.” In summer 1934, he 
and his advisors elaborated an eight-point declaration for a project of “Xinjiang 
Renewal.” The declaration stressed the imperative to create equality among 
races; establish religious freedom; provide rural relief; implement financial, 
administrative, and judicial reforms; expand education; and introduce local 
self-government.
This was soon followed by the “Nine Chief Duties” declaration, a sort of pri-
ority action plan that included eradicating corruption, economic and cultural 
development, maintaining peace, mobilizing manpower for land cultivation, 
improving communications infrastructure, preserving Xinjiang as a part of the 
republic of China, fighting imperialism through a close alliance with the ussr, 
reconstruction work, and protecting the freedom and privileges of religious 
leaders.25 These declared duties, along with the state in Xinjiang, structured 
Soviet aid to Sheng Shicai’s governorate. So, what characterized the governor-
ate in terms of state and governance structures? Although nominally the prov-
ince was part of the republic of China, it was functionally independent. The 
quasi state and its governance structure had basically four components.
First, there were Sheng Shicai’s inner circle and personal networks, most of 
whom were Han or were originally from Liaoning. This was a highly diverse 
group that included close relatives such as his wife, Qiu Yufang, and father-in-
law, long-time allies with similar interests or who were sympathetic to his 
reform program, upper-level members of the provincial bureaucracy who also 
had economic interests in the province, and a number of Guomindang cadres 
and Chinese communists.26 His inner circle would play a particularly promi-
nent role during the decline of his regime after 1941–1942.
25 Chan, “Shen Shih-Ts’ai’s Reform Programs in Sinkiang, 375.
26 The ussr’s active backing of Sheng Shicai was not meant to be against the Guomindang-
dominated government of Nanjing, nor did Moscow cut ties with the latter. It rather 
accommodated the reality of weak central control within the Chinese great space and the 
local circumstances in Xinjiang at that time. Although the ussr did not engage in overt 
war with Japan until the summer of 1945, it concluded support agreements with the 
Guomindang government in 1938 with some $200 million of loans and in-kind assistance 
to help it contain Japanese expansion. See also Mirovitskaya, “Kitaiskaya provintsiya 
Sin'tszyan v Sovetsko-Kitaiskikh otnosheniyakh (1930–1940),” 244.
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Second, although he adhered to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
early 1938 and despite his close alliance with the ussr, Sheng Shicai did not set 
up a Xinjiang branch of the Soviet Communist Party nor any similar unitary 
party for that matter. Instead, the politicization and propaganda work was car-
ried out through the Anti-Imperialist League, which he founded in summer 
1935 and reportedly had some 10,000 Han, Hui, and Turkic members by 1939.27
Third, Soviet personnel stationed in Xinjiang were crucial for the function-
ing and survival of his regime and for the planned development of state and 
society. This group was accountable to the Soviet consulate-general in Ürümçi 
and consisted of three broad categories. First, there were civilian governance and 
economic advisors and the technicians – today’s development workers and 
consultants – who had been assigned to Sheng Shicai’s cabinet, ministries, and 
a wide range of Soviet-supported economic and social infrastructure projects 
beginning in spring 1935. The exact overall number of Soviet advisors and tech-
nicians who worked in Xinjiang between 1935 and 1942 is not well documented, 
but there were likely several thousand.28 Many were of Slavic background, but 
others belonged to Central Asian Turkic groups including Soviet Uyghurs as 
well as some Han and Hui naturalized Soviet citizens.29
Second, there was the 3,000-strong Soviet regiment and one air squadron 
that had been stationed near Kumul in the wake of the Soviet military inter-
ventions to prop up Sheng Shicai in early 1934 and again in mid-1937, after the 
Japanese invasion of China. These included Soviet military advisors who 
equipped and trained Sheng Shicai’s 10,000-strong army. The latter consisted 
mostly of provincial Guomindang units, local militias, and some 1,800 Soviet 
and White Russian cavalry.30 Finally, there were the staff and the paramilitary 
27 Fook-Lam Gilbert Chan, “Shen Shih-Ts’ai’s Reform Programs in Sinkiang,” 373, 378 and 381.
28 One account mentions more than 1,000 “Soviet technicians” in two districts situated 
between Ürümçi and the Mongolian border alone, yet this is unlikely to reflect an 
 province-wide pattern because the northern portion of Xinjiang at areas used indeed to 
be a focal area for Soviet development assistance work. Li Chang, “The Soviet Grip on 
Xinjiang,” Foreign Affairs, no. 4 (1954): 499.
29 Wang, “Soviet Citizenship in Xinjiang,” 88–89.
30 In fall 1935, a loan of 2 million gold rubles was allocated for the upgrading the Xinjiang 
army. Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politburo minutes of September 13, 1935, 
rgaspi, f. 17. op. 162, d. 18, l. 141–142, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 
121853 Stalin himself and his Defense Commissar Voroshilov seemed to have had a prefer-
ence for a provincial army dominated by Han officers and rank-and-file, probably so as 
not to have too many armed and military-trained Turkic soldiers who were deemed unre-
liable and may become dangerous in case of mutinies. “Beseda tov. Tov. Stalina, Molotova 
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of Stalin’s secret police, the nkvd.31 Besides running intelligence networks in 
the province, closely watching émigré communities from the ussr, and fol-
lowing up on real and perceived anti-Soviet activities there, the nkvd assisted 
Sheng Shicai’s Governorate in setting up and training its fourth component, 
the Baoan budui (Security Preservation Corps) in 1936. The Baoan budui co-
opted, among others, the extensive informants’ networks set up under Yakub 
Beg’s emirate of Jetışar (“Seven Cities”), which existed in southwestern Xinjiang 
and was ruled from Kashgar between 1867 and 1877.32
The presence of this fourth network reveals that the Governorate actively 
co-opted native interest groups and informal institutions to build a proper 
base for his societal project among the local majority population.33 Sheng 
Shicai was quite serious about participation and local self-government in that 
respect. To start with, province-wide consultations were organized in Ürümçi 
in the spring 1935 and 1936, and again in fall 1938, to which Uyghur, Kazakh, and 
other native leaders were invited. This also included offering government posi-
tions to members of the Khoja religious aristocracy whose authority was based 
on claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad or the first four Arab caliphs 
and of the Chagatai Mongols and on institutions established during the rule of 
a Khoja confederation over much of present-day Xinjiang between 1678 and 
1759. Although Soviet-inspired secularization campaigns would be attempted 
under the influence of his advisors, Sheng Shicai seemed to understand the 
strong social role of Islam, specifically the Kubrawiyya and Nakhsh’bandiyya 
Sufi networks, among the Turkic and Hui population and the need to secure 
their backing to gain the support of the native majority.
i Voroshilova s dubanem, proiskhodivshaya v Kremle 2.9.1938,” rgaspi, f.558, op. 11, d. 323, 
l. 32–41, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121901.
31 A detailed overview of in-kind means allocated in early 1938 to the nkvd to set up a 
1,570-strong motorized regiment in Hami (Kumul) and to train and equip the local police 
force there was found in the minutes of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union of 21 January 1938, rgaspi, f. 17, op. 162, d. 22, http://digitalarchive 
. wilsoncenter.org/document/121877 Besides 15 tanks, the list contains 55 zis-5 trucks, 30 
petrol trucks, two ambulances, four vehicle repair workshops, 1,025 horses, three radio 
vehicles, and, interestingly, two film production units that were certainly meant to serve 
what today would be called “public diplomacy” or “pr.”
32 Lars-Erik Nyman, “Sinkiang 1934–1943: Dark Decade for a Pivotal Puppet,” Cahiers du 
Monde russe, 32, no. 1 (1991): 100.
33 Similar co-optation processes of local power groups and solidarity networks took place 
during the creation of nationalities and the social transformation among the Turkic and 
Tajik peoples in the Central Asian and Caspian parts of the Soviet Union. For a detailed 
examination, see Roy, La nouvelle Asie centrale, 93–139.
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He thus basically “recycled” a practice of indirect rule that had been set up 
in the imperial era around 1760, in which China’s political authority, especially 
in southern Xinjiang, was based on the co-optation of Khoja and Sufi networks 
as well as on the Chinese military garrisons and trade posts that were estab-
lished near the region’s main urban centers.34 Sheng Shicai was also supported 
by the pro-Soviet Kyrgyz of Ishaq Beg in the southwestern Ulugqat region, and 
he awarded local and provincial government posts to a dozen Uyghur leaders 
of the 1931 Kumul and Kashgar rebellions – like Hoja Niaz and Yulbars Khan –
after they were pardoned upon officially renouncing separatism. Finally, in his 
efforts to boost education, some elements of the Pan-Turkic Jadid education 
reform movement who had played an active role in the first East Turkestan 
republic of Kashgar were also integrated in the policies geared toward the 
renewal of Xinjiang.35
 Components of Soviet Aid to Xinjiang
In 1931, under Sheng Shicai’s predecessor, 82.5% of Xinjiang’s official external 
trade occurred with the ussr. Between 1933 and 1936, the official value of 
Soviet imports from Xinjiang amounted to some 66 million gold rubles, while 
exports from the ussr into the province approached 102 million. Much of this 
trade happened on a barter basis and was organized and controlled by the 
Soviet-Xinjiang Trading Company, which was established in 1931 under 
Governor Jin Shuren and operated six agencies in the province. Overall, 
Xinjiang was the ussr’s ninth-largest trading partner that year, and the fourth-
largest non-European partner after China proper, Mongolia, and Iran. During 
that period, formal trade between the province and the rest of China was close 
to nonexistent, although there was certainly informal trade with neighboring 
Gansu province, as well as cross-border trade with Mongolia and with Leh and 
Gilgit in northern India. In 1935 and 1937, the ussr gave two loans, each worth 
34 For an in-depth examination of this system of frontier control, see Kwangmin Kim’s dis-
sertation, “Saintly brokers: Uyghur Muslims, trade, and the making of Qing Central Asia, 
1696–1814” (Berkeley: University of California, 2008); Elisabeth Allès, “Usages de la frontière: 
le cas du Xinjiang (xixe-xxe siècles),” Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident, – Desseins de fron-
tières, no. 28 (2006): 127–146 and Owen Lattimore, Studies in frontier history – collected 
papers 1928–1958 (London: Oxford University Press 1962), 197.
35 Eric T. Schluessel, “History, Identity and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang,” Central 
Asian Survey, 28, no. 4 (2009): 390.
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7.5 million gold rubles, to the Xinjiang governorate.36 The pattern of Soviet-
Xinjiang development cooperation was thus set by intensive commercial inter-
action, preferential trade agreements, and state loan dependency.37
Although some development work was done in the southern oases of 
Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, much of the Soviet-backed efforts during the 
Sheng Shicai years were concentrated in and around Kulja, Ürümçi and the 
belt around and between those two centers. These northwestern parts of 
Xinjiang were quite accessible and considered sufficiently secure to permit 
sustainable investment. More important, they were also part of a larger histori-
cal Russian economic sphere and regarded as having an ethnically mixed pop-
ulation that could generate a modern proletarian base that could eventually 
support a larger socialist project. In turn, it was assumed that development in 
this geographic area would entice more remote or socially and politically more 
recalcitrant parts of the province to follow suit.
Moscow organized immediate humanitarian assistance meant to alleviate 
the consequences of armed conflict that affected Xinjiang between 1931 and 
1933. Officially called “economic stabilization aid,” this assistance was partly 
attached to loans, other settlement agreements, or meant to open markets. In 
the summer of 1934, for example, the Soviet Union reportedly sent 1,450 tons of 
wheat to Xinjiang and committed 1,000 additional tons of grain if harvests did 
not meet expectations. In addition to grain, the aid included other commodi-
ties intended to stabilize the province and return to productivity. In early 1934, 
a shipment of 250 tons of sugar, 22 tons of brick tea, 50 tons of kerosene, and 
100 tons of rice were also readied for import into Xinjiang.38 The ussr also 
provided highly securitized assistance to refugees who had fled factional fight-
ing in Xinjiang and often arrived in the Kazakh assr, especially in the province 
of Semipalatinsk and in the district of Jarkent.39 Given the security concerns 
36 David D. Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident, Ethnic Conflicts and 
International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944–1949 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 
1999), 54. Other accounts put the 1935 and 1937 Soviet loan packages to Xinjiang at 5 and 
8.76 million gold rubles, respectively. Yu Guan, “Shtrikhi k politicheskomy portrete Shen 
Shitsai,” Vostokovednye issledovaniya, no. 4 (2004): 124.
37 In Ürümçi, in the areas of Xinjiang bordering the ussr, and in trade circles, the Soviet 
ruble circulated as the de facto currency. This is quite reminiscent of the similar position 
that the euro and dollar have in neo-protectorates like Kosovo, Bosnia, and East Timor.
38 Judd Creighton Kinsley, “Staking Claims to China’s Borderland: Oil, Ores, and State 
Building in Xinjiang Province, 1893–1964 (San Diego: University of California, 2012), 182. 
This unpublished doctorate thesis is based on many Chinese-language sources.
39 Jarkent in Kazakhstan (also spelled Zharkent, and called Panfilov between 1942 and 1991) 
should not be confused with the city and oasis of Yarkand in southern Xinjiang.
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that refugees raised – especially that anti-Soviet elements might infiltrate 
among them – the nkvd, not international refugee agencies or specialized 
charities, organized the assistance and registration effort. In 1935, for example, 
1.2 million rubles were allocated to the nkvd for the purpose of accommodat-
ing “Xinjiang arrivals.”40
The first tranche of the 1935 loan of 5 million gold rubles to the Ürümçi gov-
ernment (urpra) was allocated as follows: one-quarter (1.25 million) was to be 
spent on transport and communications, and one-third (1.65 million) on light 
industry and agricultural credits. Further, 350,000 (7 percent) was budgeted for 
extractive activities (tin mining and the construction of an oil refinery), 10 per-
cent (500,000 rubles each) to purchase silver to shore up the Xinjiang Provincial 
Bank and military equipment, another 700,000 rubles for non-specified “mate-
rials earlier provided to urpra” (possibly weapons, vehicles, or even office 
equipment for urpra administrative institutions), and finally one percent, or 
50,000 rubles, for health care infrastructure.41
This snapshot clarifies the priority areas for Soviet aid to Xinjiang through-
out the Sheng Shicai period. One was the delivery of engineering assistance, 
construction machinery, trucks and tractors and, for the year 1935–1936, some 
600,000 rubles for building or upgrading roads. Although Soviet-led construc-
tion brigades carried out road projects in the south, particular importance was 
attached to some 3,200 kilometers of road connections in the northwest. More 
specifically, these included the road between Jarkent in the Kazakh (A)ssr, 
Kulja, Ürümçi and eventually Kumul, as well as the road between Ürümçi and 
the district of Urjar in Kazakhstan. Soviet advisors also created and co-staffed 
a governmental Road Committee that had to organize and oversee the mainte-
nance and securitization of these transport arteries.42 The technical cadres 
and most foremen of the work brigades were Soviet citizens. For the unskilled 
work on these labor-intensive road projects, however, they attempted to recruit 
native Ili and other Uyghurs and Kazakhs.
To an extent, this was a repeat of a social experiment carried out, with vary-
ing impact, during the construction of the Turksib Railway in the Kazakh 
(A)ssr a few years earlier. The unstated purpose of that experiment had been 
40 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politburo minutes no. 32 from 31 July to 31 August 1935, 
rgaspi, f. 17. op. 162, d. 18, l. 105, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121851.
41 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politburo minutes no. 23 of March 22, 1935, attach-
ment to point 178(op), Prilozhenie No. 1 “Raspredelenie tovarnoi ssudi Sovsintorga,” 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121828.
42 Vasilii Shmatov, “Rol’ Sovetskogo Soyuza v ‘ozdrovlenii’ sotsiyal’no-ekonomicheskoi zhizni 
provintsii Sin’tszyan (1934–37),” Mir nauki, kul’tury, obrazovaniya, 43, no. 6 (2013): 445.
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to recruit young Kazakh shepherds for menial work on the wharfs in order to 
detach them from traditional authorities and modes of production and turn 
them into the nucleus of a native proletariat. The concentration of mainly 
young native men on work sites was also a good opportunity to hold political 
meetings.43 Soviet-Xinjiang development cooperation also focused on electri-
fication and improving communication facilities in the province, although a 
postal and telegraph system already existed. Between 1934 and 1937, Soviet 
technicians installed new power stations and telephone switchboards in 
Ürümçi and Kulja, at a combined cost of 130,665 gold rubles.44 Some 2,100 kilo-
meters of telephone lines were reportedly installed during the governorate.45
 Hinterland Industrialization
A third area of development cooperation was industrialization. This included 
both extractive and light-processing industries, which seemed to be driven by 
two different, yet complementary, rationales. In the extractive sector, there 
were basically three core activities. First, from 1936 onward, Soviet personnel 
developed the Dushanzi (Maitağ in Turkic) oil fields, which had been discov-
ered in 1909. In 1939, 33 wells were drilled and 17 became operational. A refin-
ery was also built. Although developing Xinjiang’s oil industry was initially not 
a priority for Moscow, concern that the ussr would eventually be dragged into 
a war in Europe, and that the Carpathian and Caspian oil production centers 
could be occupied if not destroyed, gave a new boost to oil-related assistance 
to the province. By 1942, the ussr’s investment in Xinjiang’s oil industry at 
Dushanzi was estimated at $3 million.
Also in 1942, 158 Soviet engineers, technicians, and foremen, many of them 
with previous experience in the Baku oil fields, were employed in this sector.46 
That spring, the joint refinery operations were formalized with the creation of the 
Soviet-Xinjiang Company for the Dushanzi Oil Combinate Exploitation, a man-
agement structure, and an inter-governmental 50/50 profit-sharing agreement.47
43 Matthew J. Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism (Pittsburgh, pa: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2001), especially 131–137.
44 Vasilii Shmatov, “Rol’ Sovetskogo Soyuza v ‘ozdrovlenii’ cotsiyal’no-ekonomicheskoi 
zhizni provintsii Sin’tszyan (1934–37)”: 445.
45 Chan, “Shen Shih-Ts’ai’s Reform Programs in Sinkiang”: 379.
46 Kinsley, “Staking Claims to China’s Borderland”: 234–235.
47 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politburo minutes no. 36 of April 26, 1942, rgaspi 
f. 17 op. 162 d. 37, l.33–34, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121886.
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Second, in 1937, 2 million rubles and $40,000 were allocated for geological 
exploration of non-ferrous metals deposits. In fall 1940, 30-year concessions in 
the Ili Valley, close to the border with the Kazakh ssr, were granted to the 
joint-stock Xinjiang Tin Company to extract tin for the Soviet aircraft and can-
nery industries. At its zenith, about 60 Soviet engineers and technical cadres 
were employed on this line.48 Third, gold mining in the Altai piedmont was 
upgraded with Soviet assistance. About 20 Soviet engineers and technicians 
were employed here along with mainly Hui and Kazakh workers.49 The fact 
that the ussr’s monetary system was on the gold standard at the time, offi-
cially to limit its dependency on the international monetary system and on the 
dollar, and that the ussr used gold to trade with Western Europe, explains the 
importance that Moscow attached to this specific extractive activity.
So, cooperation with Xinjiang seemed mainly geared toward the creation of 
a classical economic hinterland – or even a raw material periphery – for the 
ussr, rather than a proper industrialization drive. Simultaneously, however, 
efforts were also invested in light industry. In 1941, for example, the ussr 
funded 11 factory  projects – sugar, matches, candles, paper, cement, wool and 
linen, tobacco, soap, and a cannery – mainly in Ürümçi and Kulja.50 These 
projects had political goals as well. Accelerated and state-initiated industrial-
ization and the formation of an industrial proletariat were considered a neces-
sary pre-requisite for socialism as well as for economic and military 
independence.51 So, Moscow’s multisectoral assistance to Sheng Shicai’s 
Xinjiang contained an element of social engineering. One key industrial proj-
ect set up in 1938, once the province had become a land corridor (the so-called 
Zeta track) for Soviet aid to the Guomindang government after the Japanese 
invasion of China in 1937, was an aircraft assembly factory. Part of a $200 mil-
lion assistance package to the national Chinese government to help it to fight 
the Japanese, the factory was initially planned for eastern Gansu but was even-
tually built on the outskirts of Ürümçi at Stalin’s insistence.52
48 Kinsley, “Staking Claims to China’s Borderland,” 232–234 and Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, Politburo minutes no. 45, rgaspi F.17 op. 162, d. 20 l.181, http://digitalarchive 
.wilsoncenter.org/document/121873.
49 Kinsley, “Staking Claims to China’s Borderland.”
50 Vasilii Shmatov, “Rol’ Sovetskogo Soyuza v ‘ozdrovlenii’ cotsiyal’no-ekonomicheskoi 
zhizni provintsii Sin’tszyan (1934–37),” 446.
51 Basile Kerblay, “L’impact des modèles « économiques » soviétiques et chinois sur le Tiers 
Monde,” Politique étrangère, 25, no. 4 (1960): 336.
52 Vasilii Shmatov, “'Sovetskie kryl’ya’ kitaiskoi aviyatsii (o stroitel’stve i deyatel’stve i 
deyatel’nosti aviasbornogo zavoda v Sin’tszyane v 1938–1941 gg,” Izvestiya Altaiskogo 
Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 80, no. 4 (2013): 97–100. For an elaborate account on 
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Depending on social geography, the indigenous Turkic population either 
practiced varied oasis agriculture geared toward local and micro-regional mar-
kets and using ancient and sophisticated irrigation systems; nomadic or semi-
nomadic animal husbandry; or hybrid forms of both. In contrast, the sedentary 
Hui and Han farmers in the province, especially in the north, were relative 
newcomers. Sheng Shicai placed great importance on agricultural develop-
ment, in hopes that his subjects would produce commodities like cotton, grain, 
and leather for lucrative export that could fill state coffers as well as enrich 
companies owned by members of his entourage.53 It was also an activity and 
sector for which he had a personal fascination. This initially translated into the 
provision of immediate relief, in the form of sheep, cattle and seeds, to farmers 
who had been affected by political unrest and in the opening of soft credit 
lines for farmers at the State Bank.54
He also curbed the extortive agricultural tax practices used by former gover-
nors, local civil servants and co-opted local rulers. Most important, he did not 
launch a Soviet-style agricultural collectivization campaign. In fact, parts of 
his jurisdiction were struggling to accommodate tens of thousands of Kazakh 
and (to a lesser extent) Mongol herders and Soviet Hui farmers who had fled 
the ussr and Mongolia following the disastrous collectivization drives there.55 
The initial slump in agricultural production caused by collectivization actually 
gave a boost to agriculture in Xinjiang, in the sense that the province became 
an exporter of cattle and cotton to the ussr – much of it through Semipalatinsk 
– to meet shortages there. The governorate undertook a number of major agri-
cultural initiatives, such as opening veterinary clinics and outreach centers 
where farmers could get access to new technologies and crop varieties and 
state-backed agricultural loans.
It also assigned military and paramilitary units and native labor brigades to 
state-sponsored land reclamation and irrigation projects.56 Soviet aid was 
instrumental to these projects. In late 1935, for instance, the Commissariat for 
Xinjiang’s function as a cockpit and corridor for Soviet assistance to the Guomindang and 
the Chinese communists, see John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet relations  1937–45: The 
Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 153–181.
53 For an examination of the rural development paradigm and the impact of the Soviet 
development model on it, see Alastair McAuley, “La politique de développement en Asie 
centrale: réflexions sur les possibilités de l’appliquer aux pays voisins du Moyen-Orient,” 
Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 15, no. 4 (1984): 5–30.
54 Chan, “Shen Shih-Ts’ai’s Reform Programs in Sinkiang,” 375–376.
55 Wang, “Soviet Citizenship in Xinjiang.”
56 Calla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), Xinjiang: China’s 
Muslim Borderland (London: M.E. Sharpe-Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 167.
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Agriculture in Moscow, despite the ongoing agriculture crisis caused by col-
lectivization in the ussr itself, reportedly offered reapers, sowing machines, 
agricultural tools, variety seeds, breeding cattle and other equipment for a 
total value of 260,000 rubles. Likewise, it provided support to a number of 
agro-industrial projects like a cotton ginnery, a vegetable oil mill, and a sawmill 
in Ürümçi.57 Table 1 shows the clear rises in agricultural productivity during 
the Sheng Shicai years.
 Social Transformation and Nationalities
Finally, education plays a key role in borderland development approaches that 
include social engineering, by instilling the appropriate norms, values, and ide-
ology. In the broader sense, efforts in education were embedded in a project of 
nation-building and social transformation. In 1934, Sheng Shicai recognized 14 
officially equal ethnic communities or nationalities of Xinjiang. In doing so, he 
57 Shmatov, “Rol’ Sovetskogo Soyuza v ‘ozdrovlenii’ cotsiyal’no-ekonomicheskoi zhizni 
provintsii Sin’tszyan (1934–37),” 446.
Table 1 The Evolution of Agricultural Productivity in Xinjiang According to Selected  
Indicators (1918–1949)
Cultivated land 
(in 1,000 hectares)
Grain 
(in 1,000 tons)
Cotton 
(in 1,000 tons)
Cattle herds 
(in million heads)
1918 802 2,061 10.5 18.4
1933 309 695 10.6 5.4*
1942 996 1,761 14.2 19.7
1949* 373** 848 5.1 10.4
Notes:
* 1931 value.
** This was the realistically cultivated part of the 1.2 million hectares of arable land area at 
that time. In our opinion, this sharp decrease is also explained by the fact that parts of Xinjiang 
were under the second East Turkestan Republic and not under provincial administration at 
that time, by the decrease of Soviet assistance and that much land remained fallow during the 
late Sheng Shicai period (1943–1944) and the Guomindang interregnum between his departure 
and the final communist takeover of Xinjiang in 1949.
Sources: Table based on Calla Wiemer, “The Economy of Xinjiang,” in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), 
Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (London: M.E. Sharpe-Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 
2004), 167. See also Judd Creighton Kinsley, “Staking Claims to China’s Borderland: Oil, Ores, and 
State Building in Xinjiang Province, 1893–1964 (San Diego: University of California, 2012), 289.
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and his nationalities committee drew heavily from the nationalities criteria in 
use right over the border in the ussr. According to Olivier Roy, these had basi-
cally three components: (1) a theoretical foundation on the concept of the 
nation – elaborated by Stalin or at least attributed to him – that was eclecti-
cally based on Marxist concepts and on nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century Russian and Western European anthropology; (2) an administrative- 
political classification based on the status of territory and language; and (3) a 
pragmatic approach to national delineation that took into account local reali-
ties, yet justified itself with the first two components.58
The creation of modern nations, based on historical or aspired identities, 
different censuses, ethnography, and even recycled concepts championed by 
Turkic nationalist intellectuals and activists had to counter transnational ide-
ologies like Pan-Turkism and Sunni Islam in order to create the basis for social-
ism. Sheng Shicai’s recognition of 14 nationalities was a clear break from 
Guomindang’s “Five Great Races under one Union” approach, which he, as a 
Guomindang-affiliated official, was supposed to follow. The “Five Great Races” 
formulation excluded Turkic people, who made up a considerable portion of 
Xinjiang’s population.
Thus for the first time, the sedentary Turkic population, with its plethora of 
micro-regional and local identities, was officially included under the common 
denominator of “Uyghurs.”59 For Sheng Shicai, this recognition was a key ele-
ment of his inclusive patriotism, since for him, they were all children of 
Xinjiang. Furthermore, since he regarded the region as an unalienable part of 
the Chinese great space, this meant they were also children of China.60 
However, his advocacy of local self-government did not include establishing a 
federation of nominally autonomous national republics and territories in 
Xinjiang, as was done in the ussr. A structure of this type was only set up in 
1949–1958, after the communist takeover of the province.61 The next step after 
58 Roy, La nouvelle Asie central, 108; Olivier Roy, “Ethnies et politique en Asie centrale,” Revue 
du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, no. 59–60 (1991): 24–27.
59 Note that initially, Uyghurs and Uyghurs from the Ili region (whose culture and society 
were distinct from the Uyghurs from the oases of southern Xinjiang and from Kumul 
because of their interaction with the Russian sphere since the 1850s and because of the Ili 
region’s role as a Sino-Russian frontier) were considered two separate national groups. 
See also Sean D. Roberts, “Imaging Uyghurstan: Re-evaluating the Birth of the Modern 
Uyghur Nation,” Central Asian Survey, 28, no. 44 (2009): 364–366. Other recognized groups 
included Uzbeks, Tatars, Kyrgyz, Kalmyk and Torgut Mongols, and Sibe.
60 Ondřej Klimeš, Struggle by the Pen — The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National 
Interest, c.1900–1949 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 164–165.
61 Bergère, “L’influence du modèle soviétique sur la politique des minorités nationales en 
Chine. La cas du Sinkiang (1949–1962),” op. cit., 1979: 414–420.
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recognition was to codify and modernize Turkic national languages by provid-
ing them with a script; by limiting “alien” Arabic, Farsi, and Islamic terms; and 
by incorporating Russian and Chinese technical, bureaucratic, and military 
terminology.62 The modern Uyghur language thus came officially into being.
As in the ussr, the national languages became the vehicles to educate a 
mostly illiterate population. Learning Russian and Chinese, which de facto 
became vectors of social progress, was also encouraged, just like learning 
Uyghur or Kazakh was encouraged among Han and Hui, at least traders, civil 
servants, officers, and other people who frequently came into contact with the 
Turkic population. Likewise, the provincial governmental newspaper, The 
Xinjiang Daily, an important mouthpiece of the Ürümçi Governorate, was pub-
lished in seven languages and produced and distributed through nine regional 
hubs. With Soviet backing, the state tried to take the lead in an education sec-
tor that had long been closely connected to religious institutions, skills and 
knowledge transfer within genealogical solidarity networks, nongovernmental 
education movements, or private educational entrepreneurship, all of which 
continued to function in some form or capacity.63
In that respect, three prominent channels of state-supported education 
appeared between 1934 and 1939. First, the secular provincial schools under 
the provincial education department. These schools, particularly concentrated 
in the north, were government-sponsored and partly based on the secular 
nationalist education system that the Guomindang promoted and tried to 
organize, conditions and resources permitting, in the areas under its control. 
With Soviet backing, Sheng Shicai’s regime managed to set up a more extensive 
version of this system in its jurisdiction.64 The Xinjiang Provincial Russian Law 
School, which had been founded with Soviet assistance in Ürümçi in 1924 and 
was already an important channel of Soviet political and cultural influence 
before Sheng Shicai’s arrival, was upgraded to a Provincial University College 
in 1935 and became the province’s first higher learning institution, although its 
staff and students would remain predominantly Han.65
62 Klimeš, Struggle by the Pen, 172–173 and Roy, La nouvelle Asie central, 124.
63 See Ildikó Bellér-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang 2008: 326–333 and Eric T. 
Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang,” Central Asian 
Survey, 28, no. 4 (2009): 384–389.
64 Gerard A. Postiglione, China’s National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and 
Development (New York: Falmer Press, 1999), 27–28.
65 Anthony R. Welch and Ruy Yang, “Internationalizing a Regional Chinese University,” in 
John D. Palmer, Yong Ha Cho, et al. (eds), The Internationalization of East Asian Higher 
Education: Globalization’s Impact (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), 71–72.
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Second, a network of independent but government-subsidized schools was 
organized under various Cultural Promotion Societies or cps. Established for 
nine of the 14 recognized nationalities between 1935 and 1939, the cps were 
initially a governorate attempt to co-opt, under the auspices of the Anti-
Imperialist League, the variety of privately sponsored schools that had been 
previously established among Uyghurs and Uzbeks by modernist and Islamic 
educators.66 The idea to use rather than outlaw these schools reportedly came 
from Soviet advisors who understood that bluntly imposing unpopular Chinese 
or  secular institutions would be counterproductive. Hence, using existing 
native networks was believed to be a more effective way to promote education, 
especially in the more recalcitrant southern portion of the province.
The first Uyghur cps were founded in Kashgar and Kulja. They operated 
autonomously but received financial and in-kind support, such as textbooks, 
from the Provincial Education Department. Their activities went well beyond 
education and included the management of private donations and Islamic 
endowments, opening cinemas and theatres, and running housing and urban 
maintenance projects.67 To carry out these public works, the cps and the gov-
ernorate often used (or, as some felt, usurped), the traditional institution of 
alwang, collective labor that resembles feudal corvée service, which was preva-
lent in Uyghur society.68 Surprisingly, the cps were also involved in trade with 
the ussr, more specifically collection and retail centers.69 As can be seen in 
Table 2, these cps school networks became the nucleus of the governorate’s 
education system.
Third, there were educational exchanges with the ussr. Soviet advisors 
trained civil servants and technicians in Xinjiang itself, or students from 
Xinjiang were sent to the ussr for higher education. Between 1934 and 1937, 
586 students from Xinjiang went to Tashkent, Alma-Ata, and Chimkent to 
study medicine, agriculture and animal husbandry, educational pedagogy, and 
public administration. Others attended political training at universities and 
technical colleges there. Of the 106 exchange students sent in 1934, 63 were 
Uyghur, 33 Han, 4 Hui, 2 Kazakh, and 2 belonged to one of the Mongol peoples. 
The following year, 100 students were sent to the ussr, including 54 Uyghur 
66 Ildikó Bellér-Hann, Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2007), 166–167.
67 Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang,” 390–392.
68 Bellér-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang., 2008: 171–175; Ildikó Bellér-Hann, “Work and 
Gender among Uyghur Villagers in Southern Xinjiang,” Cahiers d'Etudes sur la Méditerranée 
Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, no. 25 (1998): 2–5.
69 Schluessel, “History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang,” 390–392.
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and 32 Han.70 Many of the Uyghur students were Ili Uyghurs. The dispropor-
tionate presence of Han vis-à-vis their relative share in the population suggests 
several explanations: perhaps more Han had the prerequisites for such studies, 
perhaps there was less cultural resistance against sending students to the ussr 
among Han families as there was among Muslims in the south of Xinjiang, or 
perhaps there was an unstated preference to sustain a Han technical and 
bureaucratic elite.
 Final Comments and Epilogue
Of course, despite Sheng Shicai’s Soviet-backed initiatives aimed at improv-
ing Xinjiang and its society, the nature of his rule, the wicked consequences 
of good intentions, or the collision between the latter and reality, and 
Moscow’s dominant presence and patron-client relations in the province 
caused friction and resistance among several segments of society. Despite 
promises and attempts to “indigenize” formal administration and the police, 
Han domination of these institutions extended far beyond their relative share 
of the population. Local artisans and merchants heavily resented the influx of 
subsidized or duty-free Soviet consumer goods, as well as confiscations of 
their products either to line the pockets of regime cronies or to repay debts to 
the ussr. Xinjiang’s society also despised the governorate’s Soviet-style secu-
larization campaigns among the Muslim population (1935–1937) and its 
purges of alleged “Fascist, Trotskyite, and separatist plotters” and “Japanese 
agents” in 1937–1938.71
These purges took a heavy toll on the local Turkic, Han, and Hui communi-
ties and émigré Russian elites. They also had an unsettling effect on society, 
since political purges were often a smokescreen for settling banal personal or 
economic rivalries. All this, and Sheng Shicai’s increasingly erratic, if not par-
anoid, behavior in anticipation of a Soviet defeat following the invasion and 
occupation of the western ussr by German and German-allied forces in 
summer 1942 (leading to a temporary, yet abrupt, Soviet withdrawal from 
Xinjiang) and Guomindang defeat after the Japanese advanced into some of 
its strongholds in eastern China in summer 1943, contributed to his gradual 
loss of control. Eventually, in the autumn of 1944, he opted to become the 
70 Ibid.
71 Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, 154–155. Typically, depending on 
the source and account, the number of victims of the replica of the Great Terror in 
Xinjiang ranges from several hundreds to more than 100,000. Garver, Chinese-Soviet rela-
tions 1937–45, 155.
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Guomindang government’s minister of agriculture and forestry minster and 
left Xinjiang for good.72
For over a decade, Sheng Shicai ran a ruthless, militarized police state in 
Xinjiang. He also acquired personal assets, including land in his jurisdiction, 
and benefited from certain trade monopolies.73 At the same time, the societal and 
ideological vision that originally had inspired him went beyond predatory and 
cynical calculations. It was driven by a sincere urge to uplift the native popula-
tion by including them in a socialist and patriotic project.
He carried out a program that combined raw survival, idealism, and aspired 
statesmanship. The standard literature about Xinjiang should give Sheng Shicai 
more credit than the current passing mentions or clichés depicting him as a 
passive Soviet puppet or predatory warlord. Moscow’s aid motives were more 
complex than just exploiting the abundant natural resources of Xinjiang. But 
the Soviet Union eventually did not need this for its sheer survival, even though 
it might have economically needed this “spare periphery” in case its war with 
the Axis powers and the occupation of the western parts of the ussr had lasted 
much longer. What we have here is a clear case of a quasi state, or at least an 
entity bearing much of its characteristics, that came into being following the 
disintegration or dysfunctionality of a state and great space, and which formed 
the political context for a project of internally driven as well as externally-
backed social engineering. As such, it was a kind of precursor to other projects 
of aid-driven social engineering carried through, decades later, by an interna-
tionalized and privatized aid sector, the nature and dynamics of which were 
conceptualized by Fearon, Laitin, and Duffield.
The Governorate of Sheng Shicai was not unique in that respect. Similar 
multisector and state-building aid was provided by the Soviet Union in that 
period to other unrecognized de facto states in its wider borderland, like the 
Azerbaijan People’s Government of Tabriz, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 
(which both briefly existed in northern Iran during the Iranian Cold War crisis 
of 1945–1946) and, of course, the second East Turkestan Republic of Kulja that 
emerged as a secular Turkic nationalist entity in three northwestern districts 
72 For a detailed accounts on the unraveling and demise of Sheng Shicai’s rule, see Forbes, 
Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, 160–161 and Chan, “Shen Shih-Ts’ai’s Reform 
Programs in Sinkiang,” 380–381. He was eventually dismissed as “unreliable” from his new 
post in the Guomindang government too, and fled to Taiwan after the communist take-
over in mainland China where he lived until he passed away of old age in summer 1970.
73 “Pravda o sobityakh v Sin’tszyane,” anonymous report on Soviet-Guomindang relations in 
Xinjiang and on the situation in the province, rgaspi f.17 op.128 d.824 l.404, http:// 
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121823.
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of Xinjiang after Sheng Shicai’s departure, and existed from late 1944 until fall 
1949.74 It was eventually all set in what Alfred Rieber calls, without actually 
elaborating on it, “borderland opportunism.”75 In our opinion, this term is 
adequate enough to identify a paradigm in which sociological and political 
conditions typical of borderlands are amplified by the weakening of state con-
trol on one or both sides of a border or frontier and thus create opportunities 
for both local and extraneous actors to champion aspired or ideologically 
aligned societies and to demonstrate the supremacy of the championed devel-
opment model.
74 For the Tabriz and Mahabad republics, see Jana Forsmann, Testfall für die «Großen Drei»: 
die Besetzung Irans durch Briten, Sowjets und Amerikaner, 1941–1946 (Cologne and Weimar: 
Böhlau-Verlag GmbH, 2009), 114–127. For the role of Soviet assistance to East Turkestan, 
see David D. Wang, Essays on Social Disturbance in Xinjiang in the 1940s, nias Report 
Series, no. 36 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies): 52–68, Valerii Barmin, 
“Politika vybora. Vzaimootnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza i Sin’tszyana posle samoros-
puska Vostochno-Turkestanskoi Respubliki (1946–1947 gg.)” Comparative Politics, no. 4 
(2011): 89–97; Economic Research Committee of the ussr, “Proposals of the Economic 
Research Committee of the ussr Council of Ministers in connection with the Situation in 
Xinjiang” (translation), September 10, 1947, rgaspi f. 17, op. 162, d. 38, ll. 202–208, http://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121810.
75 Alfred J. Rieber, Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 396.
